POR: Dennis Falvy   

Antes de entrar en materia, permítaseme una digresión: Con la publicación de este post en su idioma original; hemos tomado la decisión de sólo seleccionar uno de ellos como máximo diario, debido a  consultas, sentires, pareceres y consejos. 

La opulencia de la información es brutal y la selección de ella es un trabajo arduo. Así que escogeremos , la que a nuestro criterio es lo más actualizado y de calidad y utilizaremos nuestros pies de página (Quotes&Unquotes) a fin de sugerirles las que a nuestro criterio, si ustedes lo tienen a bien, busquen los artículos en el internet.

Si hay un post alternativo , relativamente pequeño, lo copiaremos en los pies de página. Asimismo y si lo amerita el autor, haremos una reseña del mismo. Y, finalmente, respetaremos escrupulosamente el idioma original; es decir el inglés, advirtiendo nuevamente que con un click en el lado derecho de su mouse puesto en alguna parte del texto en cuestión, podrán ustedes tener la traducción al castellano. Obviamente la misma no es de las mejores, pero ayuda al menos a comprender en un buen porcentaje, lo que el artículo original muestra.

Este post que publicamos hoy es extraído del Wall Street Journal y a nuestro criterio es sumamente aleccionador e interesante, ya que le hace al controvertido mundo de la “Política Monetaria”; la  que se está usando intensivamente a partir de la crisis del año 2,008;es decir la denominada “Sub prime” y de una manera inmensa por los Bancos Centrales de los países grandes en proporciones e intervenciones en los mercados jamás visto en la historia financiera del mundo que conocemos.

De esto hay múltiples opiniones y hay algo que siempre debe quedar claro: Nadie tiene una “ eficiente” bola de cristal, pues el mundo es multivariable.No existe el riesgo cero en nada. Somos seres humanos finitos. La ciencia avanza de una manera impresionante. Y la era robótica se asoma en una denominada “ Cuarta Revolución Industrial”, la  que tiene sus preferencias y sus restricciones. Amén de que muchos avizoran un reventazón de burbuja en Wall Street y los mercados financieros aledaños y asimismo lo del Brexit, lo de Trump, las guerras en Siria y otros lugares y los cambios de preferencias de las gentes contra el establishment, configuran que cada vez el análisis de lo que hay en el mercado periodístico, al menos, tiene que ser atendido y entendido , en sus perspectivas correspondientes. 

Ello tal vez no es suficiente para un mejor rendimiento profesional o para estar informado cabalmente  de lo que sucede es un mundo globalizado e interconectado de las finanzas . Pero sin duda ayuda. Y esa es mi sana intención, sin absolutamente nada bajo la mesa. El compartir con ustedes amigos lectores una mejora de la información y de su propio criterio; pues vaya que las redes también tienen su lado malo. A veces asimismo mal informan y sesgan en función de intereses particulares y de otra magnitud.

Aquí el post seleccionado el día de hoy , gracias a la colaboración sistemática y extraordinaria de un excelente amigo , que quiere permanecer en el anonimato y ello se respeta.

THE WORLD’S MOST RADICAL EXPERIMENT IN MONETARY POLICY ISN’T WORKING

A generation of Japanese accustomed to falling prices have diminished the impact of negative interest rates and other stimulus policies that were supposed to spur wage and price increases; ‘people love to save’

BY JOHN LYONS AND MIHO INADA

John Lyons Reporter, The Wall Street Journal is a senior reporter based in Hong Kong, covering regional economic themes and the city of Hong Kong SAR. Previously, John spent 12 years with the journal covering Latin America, and has also called São Paulo, México D.F. and Buenos Aires home.

During Japan’s go-go 1980s, Hiromi Shibata once blew a month’s salary on a cashmere coat, wore it a few times, then retired it. Today, her daughter’s idea of a shopping spree is scrounging through her mom’s closet in Shizuoka, a provincial capital.

“About a third of my wardrobe is hand-me-downs from my mom,” says 26-year-old Nanako Shibata, who lives in Tokyo. To save on the 112-mile trip home, she rides the bus instead of the speedy bullet train, once a symbol of Japan’s rise.

The U.S. appears to be leading other parts of the globe out of an extended era where central banks relied heavily on low and negative interest rates and stimulus to jump-start growth and keep prices from falling. The Federal Reserve has raised U.S. interest rates, and the European Central Bank is considering easing its stimulus.

Japan remains definitively stuck, despite a long and aggressive experiment with ultralow rates. A quarter-century after its property bubble burst, a penny-pinching generation has come of age knowing only economic malaise, stagnant wages and deflation—a condition where prices fall instead of rise.

The belief that deflation will continue has become so ingrained it has presented seemingly insurmountable challenges to monetary policy, a lesson for other countries that are traveling a similar path.

“It is hard to change the deflationary mind-set even with radical policies,” says Frederic Neumann, co-head of Asia economics for HSBC. “I would argue Japan will remain in its funk and will remain there for many years.”

Japan is nearly four years into a Central Bank stimulus effort involving printing trillions of yen and guiding interest rates into negative territory, perhaps the globe’s most aggressive such efforts under way. Bank of Japan governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s shock-and-awe stimulus, launched in April 2013, fizzled after a short-lived spurt of growth and rising prices. Japan fell back into deflation last year. More recently, the inflation rate has been bouncing around near zero.

In November, Mr. Kuroda postponed his goal of reaching 2% inflation, all but admitting he is out of ideas. He said in a series of speeches last year that an entrenched “deflationary mind-set” stifled hope that wages or prices will rise, limiting the impact of monetary policies such as negative rates. Mr. Kuroda declined to comment through a spokesman.

Japan’s inflation rate has ticked above zero in recent months, which economists attribute to the election of U.S. President Donald Trump, a stronger dollar and higher oil prices—not economic fundamentals in Japan. Few see Japan returning to robust growth and rising prices.

Deflation is bad for an economy because it undermines economic growth. Businesses earn less, so they invest less, cut wages and stop hiring. Amid the economic uncertainty, consumers stop spending, furthering the downward spiral.

The idea behind ultralow rates is that they jolt consumers and businesses into spending by kindling inflation. But Japan’s deflationary expectations have become so routine that consumers and businesses refrain from spending no matter how low the central bank goes. There is evidence, in fact, that rock-bottom rates are backfiring by frightening consumers into saving for perilous economic times, not spending.

In an era of central-bank improvisation, no other nation has pushed the envelope as much. The Bank of Japan was the first to lower its benchmark rate to near zero in 1999, long before Europe, the U.K. and the U.S. did so in response to the 2008 financial crisis. In 2001, Japan began flooding its financial system with cash to try to spur inflation and growth, a practice called quantitative easing that was later adopted in the West.

Bank of Japan governor Haruhiko Kuroda has said a ‘deflationary mind-set’ is hampering the nation’s economy. Photo: Kiyoshi Ota/Bloomberg News

Mr. Kuroda in 2013 began pumping so much money into the financial system—eventually around $700 billion a year—that some investors worried hyperinflation or asset bubbles would form. That hasn’t happened. Last year, the Bank of Japan followed the European Central Bank in guiding rates into negative territory, a radical attempt to force banks to lend more money by making it costly if they don’t.

Japan’s predicament today was almost unthinkable during its 1980s boom, when Japanese tycoons bought trophy properties such as New York’s Rockefeller Center and Tokyo real-estate prices were the world’s highest. In 1989, Japan initiated interest-rate hikes that popped real-estate and stock-market bubbles.

Since then, annual growth has averaged less than 1% amid periodic recessions. Prices began falling in the late 1990s.

Japan’s economy dropped to the world’s third-largest after fast-growing China surpassed it as No. 2. The Nikkei stock-market average is around half its 1989 peak. Property prices have fallen broadly for a quarter of a century.

Frozen-dessert maker Akagi Nyugyo ran an apologetic advertisement last year after implementing a 9 cent increase, its first in 25 years. Japanese companies are sitting on nearly $2 trillion in cash, idle money that officials contend should be invested in Japan.

The deflationary landscape is deeply imprinted on the 20 million Japanese between ages 20 and 34 who grew up after prices started falling. Wage increases, rising stocks or banks that pay decent interest on deposits are all hypotheticals to them. They live in a world where anything they buy today might be had for less tomorrow. Their instinct is to do the safe thing and economize.

They reject the consumerism of their parents’ generation as excess. Some live with roommates in group homes, a new phenomenon for Japan, and dine on $3 beef bowls. If they spend on anything, it is travel. In a deflationary society, experiences don’t lose value, while anything you buy does.

Some older Japanese who knew the privations of the postwar years see a worrisome lack of ambition in younger people. Japan uses the term “neets” to describe young people “not in education, employment or training,” while “freeters” work unstable part-time or contract jobs. Japanese “parasite singles” never leave their parents’ home, and women complain about “herbivore men” uninterested in the opposite sex.

“Their problem is they are too comfortable,” says Heizo Takenaka, a former economy minister.

“Their expectations are low. We wanted to own the excellent cars. But they don’t seem to want to.”

Many economists believed the Bank of Japan’s 2013 stimulus would be enough to jolt the nation out of its downward spiral of weak growth and falling prices. Mr. Kuroda and others in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government point to an initial burst of inflation and growth as signs the stimulus will eventually work. Others say the monetary policies worked until they were undermined by a 2014 sales-tax increase.

A Bank of Japan survey in October found only 5% of respondents planned to spend more next year, while 48% intended to cut.

Many Japanese millennials are dedicated to economizing, eating at places like Yoshinoya, a fast-food chain that specializes in inexpensive beef bowls. Photo: Jeremie Souteyrat for The Wall Street Journal

Keita Kameyama, a 30-year-old civil servant in Kagawa, a rural province, has been saving around 25% of his $40,000 salary each year to eventually marry his longtime girlfriend. He lives at home with his mother, drives an old Honda and rarely shops.

The central bank’s stimulus measures had no effect on Mr. Kameyama’s spending. He still salts away his money in plain-vanilla bank accounts. He fears Japan’s long stagnation will wipe out his pension, and worries he won’t have enough money to care for his mother—a growing concern in a country with twice as many people over 60 than between 20 and 34.

He sees bank accounts, which offer minuscule interest rates on deposits despite negative short-term rates, as the only way to save. Hyakujushi Bank, Ltd. the biggest in Kagawa, pays only 0.05% on deposits and has paid less than 1% since 1995.

“People in Kagawa love to save,” says Mr. Kameyama. “I have heard [the Bank of Japan] is trying very hard to get people to spend their money, but I don’t think I will be opening my wallet.”

Many young Japanese economize because they simply don’t have enough money. More are working low-paying and temporary jobs with no benefits.

“Companies aren’t growing, and they have aging workforces that they can’t fire,” says Takuji Okubo, an economist and founder of the Japan Macro Advisors research group. “So there’s no room to hire young people.”

Automobile, beer and cosmetics firms have slashed young-adult advertising and market to retirees instead, says Yohei Harada, head of the youth-marketing unit at Tokyo advertising agency Hakuhodo Inc. “The role of parents and children is getting reversed, where the parents from the bubble generation still act like children and want to buy the fancy car, while their children in the post-bubble generation worry about their parents’ spending,” he says.

Takashi Saito, a 33-year-old unmarried entrepreneur, was living in group apartment in Tokyo in 2015 when he decided to start a business. His idea: an online clothing-rental company for women who want a varied wardrobe but don’t want to pay for it. For $45 a month, clients rent three articles of clothing at a time, which they can return for others when they like.

Takashi Saito, a 33-year-old entrepreneur, launched an online clothing-rental company for women. Photo: Jeremie Souteyrat for The Wall Street Journal

Mr. Saito thought it would be easy to get a loan because Japan’s low-rate policies are meant to spur banks to lend more to small businesses. It wasn’t.

He asked Japan Finance Corp., a state-owned institution set up to lend to small businesses, for $200,000. After much haggling, he got less than $50,000. A year later, as the business grew, he asked for more. He was rejected. Japan Finance Corp. declined to comment.

Bank analysts say Japanese lenders have become more conservative, particularly with startup companies that have no collateral, because low rates cut into profits. In the 11-months after Japan’s rates went negative last year, Japan Finance Corp.’s loan portfolio shrank.

Mr. Saito raided savings, borrowed from family and is hoping for venture capital.

Japanese clothing brand Uniqlo became a hit in the deflation era, appealing to a nation of penny pinchers with inexpensive casual wear. But customers stopped buying Uniqlo after price increases in 2015, forcing the retailer to cut prices to win back sales.

Uniqlo founder Tadashi Yanai blames negative rates and other central bank policies, such as quantitative easing, for worrying consumers. “It’s anxiety about the future,” he said in an interview. “They have to stop negative rates. That’s idiotic.”

Nanako Shibata cut her hours at a job-placement service and moved into a less expensive apartment. Photo: Jeremie Souteyrat for The Wall Street Journal

J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.’s Japan economist, Masaaki Kanno, says the deflation mind-set is entrenched because it is rational. With wages unchanged for 25 years, young adults don’t believe they will earn more in the future.

Some economists contend the government should try even more fiscal stimulus and monetary easing. Others argue the stimulus has already saddled Japan with so much debt—now 230% of gross domestic product—that it could end in an economic collapse.

Ms. Shibata, the Tokyo resident who raids her mother’s closet, recently cut her hours at a job-placement service to three days a week. To do so, she moved into an apartment that rents for half what she was paying. She has stopped shopping altogether. She sees no point in pouring her time into a career. She is pursuing contemporary dance instead.

“I think it’s not fair if I get consumed completely by a company,” says Ms. Shibata.

“Nowadays, we can hardly expect a raise.”

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QUOTE

Recomendamos ir al Internet y pulsar :

‘Bad Banks’ Spread Across China

Nearly 40 asset-management companies are vacuuming up bad debts, but it’s more like sweeping problems under the rug

By Anjani Trivedi

Colocando en el texto el cursor y click derecho tendrán una traducción al castellano.

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QUOTE 2

Asimismo : Whatever happened to secular stagnation? (¿ Qué pasó con el estancamiento secular?

Del blog de Gavyn Davies.

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QUOTE 3

The End of the Asian Century by Michael Auslin – strategic games

An examination of the rise of China and the future role of the US in the región

by Lucy Hornby

No sooner had we got used to thinking of ourselves as living in the “Asian century” than it might be all over. So argues Michael Auslin in The End of the Asian Century: “We are on the cusp of a change in the global zeitgeist, from celebrating a strong and growing Asia to worrying about a weak and dangerous Asia.”

One early outcome of Donald Trump’s presidency has been a shake-up in assumptions about America’s strategic role in Asia. The message from this book is ultimately one that supports maintaining a US presence in the face of a strengthening China. It is, though, a product of pre-Trumpian Washington, when the Obama/Clinton “pivot to Asia” and the Trans-Pacific Partnership dominated the agenda.

This book will bring readers up to speed on recent history: “We in the west have not yet caught up mentally with the way globalisation has transformed the Asia-Pacific,” Auslin writes. But there’s little insight into how Asians view China’s re-emergence, America’s presence or the region’s future. The book is a crash course on the risks in Asia, without exploring the solutions Asians can offer.

The author, a Japan expert at the American Enterprise Institute, attacks the idea that Asia (read China) will continue booming, resulting in that elusive crown of “global leadership”.

Many in the US do buy into this without understanding China’s limitations, so it is a useful starting point: “Western observers assumed in the 1980s that Japan would continue to grow forever; a similar assumption still dominates many discussions of China,” he says. The analogy isn’t lost on Chinese scholars and policymakers, who worry about the future costs of China’s serial asset bubbles.

China’s spectacular growth is indeed slowing, but Auslin doesn’t delve deep into how that plays out. Historically, when China is at peace, the sheer size of its economy sucks littoral states into its orbit. Cambodia and Laos are under Beijing’s sway; Mongolia, Myanmar, Thailand and North Korea have struggled against China’s gravity.

Ironically, a sharply slowing China also creates problems for the region. Debt from white elephant projects and infrastructure orientated towards a shrinking market, combined with a corrupted pro-China elite, could sour into popular discontent.

This scenario might tempt China to intervene abroad, and ethnic tolerance could turn into racial tension. Then there’s the appeal of Middle Eastern fundamentalism in Asia’s diverse Muslim communities.

Auslin is on more familiar ground with the arms race around the South China Sea, which leads to a proposal for “concentric triangles” of American alliances to contain China. By focusing on potential flashpoints, however, he underestimates how much the multi-faceted Sino-American relationship has served as ballast, allowing China’s “peaceful rise”.

Auslin laments Asia’s lack of a “security architecture”, a theme that dominated a recent security conference in Beijing. As Chinese participants pointedly remarked, Nato in Europe was founded with a common enemy in mind. Would China be the enemy of an Asian Nato? China’s importance makes that undesirable for every Asian state and most American interest groups.

Rather than clear lines dividing allies and baddies, strategy in Asia involves webs of relationships, allowing frequent recalibration based on relative strengths and weaknesses. Think of Go, the game where a strategic build-up of pieces allows the winner suddenly to flip the board.

China is gaining ground in the South China Sea and probing US willingness to defend Taiwan, even as many Chinese technocrats (and quite possibly Xi Jinping himself) doubt the abilities of their boastful military. Others worry that foreign (including Taiwanese) investment in China would decamp, poleaxing the economy and dooming China. Meanwhile, a brittle impasse between the US and North Korea is frozen by Washington politics that prevent directly engaging Pyongyang, an approach that would shift the board.

Does the US presence in the region enable the Asian century, or hinder it? Washington needs to figure out what Asians want, and what it wants, before losing its balance.

The reviewer is the FT’s deputy bureau chief in Beijing