POR: DENNIS FALVY  

Encuentro que aún no se entiende bien en el Perú; qué es la politica de dinero fácil implantada por los bancos centrales de los países grandes, como consecuencia de la crisis sub prime, aunque ya antes el central de japón había utilizado esta herramienta monetaria, por la recesión que sufre por casi unos 27 años. Así que he decidido colocar 5 notas que están a disposición en el Internet. Todas en castellano y una más complicada e ilustrativa en el idioma inglés. El artículo es extenso, pero aleccionador. Empiezo con el BCE pues es quien está usando la herramienta intensamente y es muy criticado .Esto a fin de que mas que nada, los estudiantes en el area de las finanzas , que accedan a este blog, puedan situar de una vez por todas el uso de esta herramienta que es esencial para entender en parte lo que está pasando en el mundo económico financiero internacional , lo que estoy seguro que la mayoría de macrobúhos, politicos, opinólogos y periodistas de la Tv, no entienden en sus perspectivas correspondientes. Aquí va la primera nota , en función de lo que viene haciendo el Banco Central Europeo (BCE) que compra valores mensualmante por 80,000 millones de Euros y que causa críticas muy fuertes de algunos banqueros;mas que nada alemanes

QUÉ ES LA EXPANSIÓN CUANTITATIVA DEL BC

Seis puntos claves para entender el gran plan de estímulos aprobados para la zona euro

Eel Banco Central Europeo (BCE) puso en marcha un mecanismo de compras de deuda pública (llamado "expansión cuantitativa" en la indescifrable jerga financiera) que se supone ha hecho historia en la eurozona. ¿Por qué? ¿En qué nos afecta? ¿Por qué se supone que es decisivo para salir de la crisis? Seis claves al respecto:

1. ¿EN QUÉ CONSISTE EXACTAMENTE LA “EXPANSIÓN CUANTITATIVA”?

En que el BCE compra a partir de marzo títulos de deuda pública y privada (pero sobre todo pública) por valor de unos 60.000 millones de euros mensuales hasta al menos septiembre de 2016 esto se subió luego a 80,000 euros mes) . Se trata básicamente de bonos emitidos por Gobiernos o por instituciones públicas de la Zona euro (como el Banco Europeo de Inversiones o el ICO español, por ejemplo) con un vencimiento de entre 2 y 30 años. Las adquisiciones no se harán en las subastas de los tesoros de cada país, sino en el mercado secundario, donde inversores de todo pelaje compran y venden títulos ya emitidos en su día por los Estados. En total, por 19 meses, el plan tendría un presupuesto de 1,14 billones de euros. No se comprará por ahora deuda griega (porque el BCE no puede pasar del 33% de bonos emitidos por un Gobierno), pero por lo demás hay pocas excepciones: el BCE aceptará incluso la deuda con intereses negativos (la que le cuesta dinero a quien presta) con un límite del -0,2%, que es la tasa que el BCE cobra a los bancos por depositar su dinero en el organismo de Fráncfort.

2. ¿A ESPAÑA CUÁNTO LE TOCA?

Será el Banco de España el que realice las compras y en total, según las cuentas que expuso Mario Draghi en la primera presentación que hizo, el pasado 22 de enero, el plan supondrá la adquisición de unos 100.000 millones de euros en bonos españoles si el programa se hace efectivo hasta septiembre de 2016. Y es que el presidente del BCE advirtió de que, si el objetivo de inflación no se consigue (ese menos pero cerca del 2%), los estímulos pueden prolongarse más allá de la fecha prevista para el fin del programa. Los 100.000 millones, en cualquier caso, equivaldrán a alrededor del 10% de toda la deuda pública española.

3. ¿POR QUÉ TIENE UN NOMBRE TAN RARO: EXPANSIÓN CUANTITATIVA?

El nombre, para empezar, es oficioso, pero resulta la forma más común que usan los analistas para referirse al plan Draghi. Viene del nombre que la Reserva Federal (Fed), que es el banco central de Estados Unidos, dio a sus estímulos masivos, que comenzaron en 2008 y se han terminado. Eran los Quantitative Easing (QE), que se fueron llamando coloquialmente por la abreviatura QE1, QE2 o QE3 en función de la ronda en que se encontraran. La traducción al español —expansión cuantitativa— no lo hace más explicativo, pero viene a indicar que es una expansión monetaria o de liquidez llevada a cabo por el BCE. En resumen, Draghi ha puesto en marcha la máquina de imprimir dinero. Mientras el QE americano estaba vinculado a lograr una tasa de paro baja en EE UU, el europeo se ha ligado a las metas de inflación.

4. ¿QUÉ BUSCA EL BCE CON ESTO?

El objetivo de fondo es que los inversores acaben por perder el apetito por la deuda pública y desvíen el dinero a una inversión más rentable en la economía productiva. Buena parte de la deuda de los Estados está en manos de los bancos de la Zona euro y el BCE quiere que se dediquen a dar más crédito. Si el BCE entra en tromba a comprar bonos soberanos, sus precios subirán y la rentabilidad de estos —que ya está en mínimos históricos— bajará aún más. La medida supone una inyección de liquidez en el mercado y, por tanto, debilita la cotización del euro (la divisa está en mínimos en 13 años con relación al dólar). Esta depreciación hace más baratas y competitivas las exportaciones europeas, lo que ayuda a la recuperación. Además, como consecuencia del estímulo al consumo interno y externo, el banco central de la Zona euro combate el riesgo de deflación, que es una bajada generalizada y prolongada de los precios. ¿Es negativa la baja inflación? En principio, no, pero puede llegar a serlo (Véase ¿Es bueno o malo que los precios bajen?). Los precios en la eurozona cayeron un 0,3% en febrero y el objetivo de inflación del BCE es cerca (aunque por debajo) del 2%.

5. ¿POR QUÉ EL QE PONE A BERLÍN DE LOS NERVIOS?

Porque Alemania se ha erigido en firme defensora de la ortodoxia y el dichoso QE es el máximo exponente de una medida monetaria no convencional. La compra de bonos públicos a gran escala es un punto de inflexión en la hoja de servicios del BCE: nunca hasta ahora había tomado una medida de estímulo tan agresiva (aunque ha dejado el precio de dinero a cero y ha concedido toneladas de crédito barato a los bancos). En el mandato del banco queda claro que este no puede financiar a los estados y debe centrarse en la estabilidad de los precios y el riesgo de la alta inflación es una pesadilla histórica para los alemanes. Como concesión a los llamados halcones o guardianes de la ortodoxia, solo el 20% de los riesgos será compartido, el 80% restante recaerá en cada banco central del país.

6. ¿Y ESTO LLEGARÁ SOLO A LOS BANCOS O TAMBIÉN AL BOLSILLO DE LA GENTE?

El jueves Draghi dijo que sí, que las medidas de estímulo (en general) ya se estaban notando en la economía real por la vía de una cierta recuperación del crédito. En los mercados, la medida actúa como si estuviera vigente desde hace un mes: la rentabilidad de la deuda pública está en mínimos, en muchos casos ya en negativo, y las primas de riesgo también se han hundido. (Ver: ¿Pero en qué nos afecta la dichosa prima de riesgo a los bolsillos?). Para empezar, el programa del BCE dará más liquidez a los bancos y eso hará bajar el euríbor, que es el tipo de interés al que se prestan los bancos entre sí y marca la referencia de las hipotecas. Además, la caída del euro también ayuda a la recuperación (ver punto 4). Y el crédito debería acabar por ser más fácil y barato, aunque muchos expertos ven el problema del crédito en la solvencia de la demanda y no en la liquidez.

BLOG SALMON ESPAÑOL

Señala que Mario Draghi prolonga el estímulo monetario y “ japoniza a Europa.

El Banco Central Europeo en su lucha desesperada contra la deflación de precios volvió a abrir el grifo del dinero. Sin embargo las medidas fueron decepcionantes para una banca que sigue sobreapalancada y con alto nivel de deudas incobrables. El plan de inyecciones del dinero por parte del BCE que terminaría en septiembre de 2016 fue prolongado hasta marzo de 2017confirmando la debilidad económica y el declive general de los precios impulsado por el petróleo y las materias primas.

La prolongación de la QE confirma que las políticas monetarias han llegado a un punto muerto y así lo demostró el masivo desplome bursátil de ayer. El Ibex35 cayó -2,41%, el Dax alemán en -3,58%, el Cac francés en -3,58, y el FTSE en -2,27. Fue un aunténtico jueves negro. El anuncio de Draghi no fue suficiente dado que los inversionistas esperaban un nuevo regalo navideño, pese a que ahora se comprará deuda regional y de ayuntamientos.

Esta nueva apertura del grifo es porque la inflación subyacente se encuentra en torno al 0,6 por ciento y muy por debajo de la meta del 2 por ciento anual. El BCE quiere evitar que una disminución masiva de los precios contraiga aún más la actividad económica. Los precios bajos son el reflejo de una caída generalizada de la demanda que conlleva reducciones salariales y caídas en la inversión productiva. Por eso el BCE anunció que ampliará sus compras multimillonarias de títulos en un plan que se extenderá por lo menos hasta marzo 2017.

Con esta medida Draghi no hace más que replicar las políticas de la Reserva Federal y del Banco de Japón. Si Japón lleva dos décadas perdidas con estas políticas podemos ver el futuro de Europa, atrapada en una larga crisis de la que a siete años de su inicio aún no logra levantarse. Estamos viviendo la japonización de la zona euro.

Pese a que las millonarias inyecciones de liquidez al sistema financiero no han desencadenado una millonaria dinámica de inversión en las empresas, ni han significado una disminución masiva del desempleo y una inflación del orden esperable del 2 por ciento, el BCE sigue impulsando medidas erróneas que solo alientan la especulación financiera. Como además los bancos son penalizados por sus tenencias en efectivo (menos 0,2 por ciento, y desde ayer en menos 0,3 por ciento), los bancos facilitan el dinero a las únicas inversiones que siguen siendo rentables: la especulación inmobiliaria y bursátil. Es decir, se pretende salir de la crisis financiera con las mismas acciones que la desencadenaron.

La medicina del BCE no ha funcionado pero se sigue aplicando la misma receta y cada vez en dosis mayores. Solo la deuda crece y los gobiernos y las empresas hoy están más endeudados que en 2008, al inicio de la crisis. Y esto es porque todas las proyecciones optimistas han fracasado y no se quiere aceptar que se llegó al límite de la deuda y que la economía está en un sincero estado de coma.

Las políticas del BCE han disparado la inflación en los mercados de activos y esto es lo que hace subir los precios de las casas, los bonos y las acciones. Pero este es el juego de los ricos. La clase media sigue con un ingreso estancado y cada vez con menos acceso al mercado. Esta política de redistribución es uno de los hechos más cuestionables.

Si se decía que el objetivo de los bancos centrales de mantener el control de la inflación era para no perjudicar el poder adquisitivo de los salarios, ahora queda en claro qué es lo que verdaderamente se oculta con la fijación a la baja de los bienes básicos: la generación de un mundo polarizado donde el 1 por ciento es dueño de todos los activos mientras el 99 por ciento restante es esclavo de las deudas.

EXPANSIÓN CUANTITATIVA (Wikipedia)

La expansión cuantitativa (EC) —en menor medida, flexibilización cuantitativa (FC)— (en inglés, quantitative easing, cuyo acrónimo es QE) es una herramienta no convencional de política monetaria utilizada por algunos bancos centrales para aumentar la oferta de dinero, aumentando el exceso de reservas del sistema bancario, por lo general mediante la compra de bonos del propio Gobierno central para estabilizar o aumentar sus precios y con ello reducir las tasas de interés a largo plazo. Esta medida suele ser utilizada cuando los métodos más habituales de control de la oferta de dinero no han funcionado; como cuando la tasa de interés de descuento o la tasa de interés interbancaria están cerca de cero.

"Cuantitativa" se refiere a la creación de una cantidad específica de dinero, "expansión" (o "flexibilización") se refiere a la reducción de la presión sobre los bancos. Sin embargo, otra explicación es que el nombre viene de la expresión en idioma japonés para "política monetaria estimulante", que utiliza el término "flexibilización". La relajación cuantitativa es a veces descrito coloquialmente como "imprimir dinero", aunque en realidad no es más que el dinero que pasó de los depósitos bancarios en dólares a los instrumentos financieros. Entre los ejemplos de economías en las que esta política se ha utilizado incluye a Japón a principios del siglo XXI, y los Estados Unidos, el Reino Unido y la zona euro durante la crisis financiera mundial de 2007 hasta la fecha, ya que el programa es adecuado para las economías donde la tasa de interés bancaria, la tasa de descuento y/o la tasa de interés interbancaria están cerca de cero.

JAPÓN

La expansión cuantitativa, es un instrumento de política monetaria que el Banco de Japón (BOJ) utilizó para combatir la deflación a comienzos de 2000.

El BOJ decidió mantener los tipos de interés a corto plazo cerca de sus valores mínimos, cercanos a cero, desde el año 1999. Más recientemente, el BOJ ha inundado a los bancos comerciales con un exceso de liquidez para promover los préstamos privados, dejando a estos bancos comerciales con grandes excesos de reservas.

QUANTITATIVE EASING

(From Wikipedia, the free enciclopedia)

ESTE ARTICULO NOTABLE TIENE COMO 136 NOTAS, LAS QUE EX PROFESO LAS HE SUPRIMIDO Y NO COPIADO. EL POST ES COMPLETO Y PARA QUIEN QUIERA ADENTRASE A ESTE COMPLEJO MECANISMO SU LECTURA ES ESCLARECEDORA.

Quantitative easing (QE) is a monetary policy used by central banks to stimulate the economy. It is usually used when standard monetary policy has become ineffective. A central bank implements quantitative easing by buying financial assets from commercial banks and other financial institutions, thus raising the prices of those financial assets and lowering their yield, while simultaneously increasing the money supply.

This differs from the more usual policy of buying or selling short-term government bonds to keep interbank interest rates at a specified target value.

Expansionary monetary policy to stimulate the economy typically involves the central bank buying short-term government bonds to lower short-term market interest rates.However, when short-term interest rates reach or approach zero, this method can no longer work. In such circumstances, monetary authorities may then use quantitative easing to further stimulate the economy by buying assets of longer maturity than short-term government bonds, thereby lowering longer-term interest rates further out on the yield curve.

Quantitative easing can help ensure that inflation does not fall below a target.Risks include the policy being more effective than intended in acting against deflation (leading to higher inflation in the longer term, due to increased money supply), or not being effective enough if banks remain reluctant to lend and potential borrowers are too nervous to borrow. According to the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. Federal Reserve System, and various economists, quantitative easing undertaken since the global financial crisis of 2007–08 has mitigated some of the economic problems since the crisis. Quantitative easing is distinguished from standard central banking monetary policies, which are usually enacted by buying or selling government bonds on the open market to reach a desired target for the interbank interest rate. However, if a recession or depression continues even when a central bank has lowered interest rates to nearly zero, the central bank can no longer lower interest rates. The central bank may then implement a set of tactics known as quantitative easing. This policy is often considered a last resort to stimulate the economy.

A central bank enacts quantitative easing by purchasing—without reference to the interest rate—a set quantity of bonds or other financial assets on financial markets from private financial institutions.[1][9] The goal of this policy is to facilitate an expansion of private bank lending; if private banks increase lending, it would increase the money supply, though QE does directly increase the broad money supply even without further bank lending. Additionally, if the central bank also purchases financial instruments that are riskier than government bonds, it can also lower the interest yield of those assets (as those assets are more scarce in the market, and thus their prices go up correspondingly).

Quantitative easing, and monetary policy in general, can only be carried out if the central bank controls the currency used in the country. The central banks of countries in the Eurozone, for example, cannot unilaterally decide to employ quantitative easing. They must instead rely on the European Central Bank's governing council (composed of all national central banks governors) to agree on a common monetary policy, which they (national central banks) implement.

Multiple economists and commentators have argued that the US Federal Reserve used a form of quantitative easing in the 1930s and 1940s to fight the Great Depression. Nonetheless, after the Federal Reserve instituted quantitative easing programs in the wake of the global 2007-2008 financial crisis, its actions were repeatedly called "unprecedented" by pundits and news sources. At least one professional commentator has created a chart to point out that, as a percentage of GDP, the Federal Reserve's post-financial crisis balance sheet had still not, as of May 2013, exceeded the percentages reached between approximately 1939 and 1948.

JAPAN BEFORE 2007

A policy termed 'quantitative easing' (量的金融緩和, ryōteki kin'yū kanwa) was first used by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to fight domestic deflation in the early 2000s. The BOJ had maintained short-term interest rates at close to zero since 1999. The Bank of Japan had for many years, and as late as February 2001, claimed that "quantitative easing ... is not effective" and rejected its use for monetary policy.

According to the Bank of Japan, the central bank adopted quantitative easing on 19 March 2001. Under quantitative easing, the BOJ flooded commercial banks with excess liquidity to promote private lending, leaving them with large stocks of excess reserves and therefore little risk of a liquidity shortage. The BOJ accomplished this by buying more government bonds than would be required to set the interest rate to zero. It later also bought asset-backed securities and equities and extended the terms of its commercial paper–purchasing operation.[43] The BOJ increased the commercial bank current account balance from ¥5 trillion to ¥35 trillion (approximately US$300 billion) over a four-year period starting in March 2001. The BOJ also tripled the quantity of long-term Japan government bonds it could purchase on a monthly basis.

AFTER 2007

Since the advent of the global financial crisis of 2007–08, policies similar to those undertaken by Japan have been used by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Eurozone. Quantitative easing was used by these countries because their risk-free short-term nominal interest rates were either at or close to zero. In the United States, this interest rate is termed the federal funds rate; in the United Kingdom, it is termed the official bank rate.

During the peak of the financial crisis in 2008, the US Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet dramatically by adding new assets and new liabilities without "sterilizing" these by corresponding subtractions. In the same period, the United Kingdom also used quantitative easing as an additional arm of its monetary policy to alleviate its financial crisis.

FEDERAL RESERVE HOLDINGS OF TREASURY NOTES (BLUE) AND MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES

The U.S. Federal Reserve System held between $700 billion and $800 billion of Treasury notes on its balance sheet before the recession. In late November 2008, the Federal Reserve started buying $600 billion in mortgage-backed securities.[47] By March 2009, it held $1.75 trillion of bank debt, mortgage-backed securities, and Treasury notes; this amount reached a peak of $2.1 trillion in June 2010. Further purchases were halted as the economy started to improve, but resumed in August 2010 when the Fed decided the economy was not growing robustly. After the halt in June, holdings started falling naturally as debt matured and were projected to fall to $1.7 trillion by 2012. The Fed's revised goal became to keep holdings at $2.054 trillion. To maintain that level, the Fed bought $30 billion in two- to ten-year Treasury notes every month.[48]

In November 2010, the Fed announced a second round of quantitative easing, buying $600 billion of Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011.[49][50] The expression "QE2" became a ubiquitous nickname in 2010, used to refer to this second round of quantitative easing by US central banks.[51] Retrospectively, the round of quantitative easing preceding QE2 was called "QE1".

A third round of quantitative easing, "QE3", was announced on 13 September 2012. In an 11–1 vote, the Federal Reserve decided to launch a new $40 billion per month, open-ended bond purchasing program of agency mortgage-backed securities. Additionally, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced that it would likely maintain the federal funds rate near zero "at least through 2015." According to NASDAQ.com, this is effectively a stimulus program that allows the Federal Reserve to relieve $40 billion per month of commercial housing market debt risk. Because of its open-ended nature, QE3 has earned the popular nickname of "QE-Infinity." On 12 December 2012, the FOMC announced an increase in the amount of open-ended purchases from $40 billion to $85 billion per month.[58]

On 19 June 2013, Ben Bernanke announced a "tapering" of some of the Fed's QE policies contingent upon continued positive economic data. Specifically, he said that the Fed could scale back its bond purchases from $85 billion to $65 billion a month during the upcoming September 2013 policy meeting.[59][not in citation given] He also suggested that the bond-buying program could wrap up by mid-2014.[60] While Bernanke did not announce an interest rate hike, he suggested that if inflation followed a 2% target rate and unemployment decreased to 6.5%, the Fed would likely start raising rates. The stock markets dropped by approximately 4.3% over the three trading days following Bernanke's announcement, with the Dow Jones dropping 659 points between 19 and 24 June, closing at 14,660 at the end of the day on 24 June. On 18 September 2013, the Fed decided to hold off on scaling back its bond-buying program, and announced in December 2013 that it would begin to taper its purchases in January of 2014. Purchases were halted on 29 October 2014 after accumulating $4.5 trillion in assets.

UNITED KINGDOM BANK OF ENGLAND BOUGHT

During its QE programme, the gilts from financial institutions, along with a smaller amount of relatively high-quality debt issued by private companies.The banks, insurance companies, and pension funds could then use the money they received for lending or even to buy back more bonds from the bank. Further, the central bank could lend the new money to private banks or buy assets from banks in exchange for currency.[citation needed] These measures have the effect of depressing interest yields on government bonds and similar investments, making it cheaper for business to raise capital. Another side effect is that investors will switch to other investments, such as shares, boosting their price and thus encouraging consumption.[66] QE can reduce interbank overnight interest rates and thereby encourage banks to loan money to higher interest-paying and financially weaker bodies.

Beginning in March 2009, the Bank of England had purchased around £165 billion in assets as of September 2009 and around £175 billion in assets by the end of October 2009. At its meeting in November 2009, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted to increase total asset purchases to £200 billion. Most of the assets purchased have been UK government securities (gilts); the Bank has also purchased smaller quantities of high-quality private-sector assets. In December 2010, MPC member Adam Posencalled for a £50 billion expansion of the Bank's quantitative easing programme, while his colleague Andrew Sentance has called for an increase in interest rates due to inflation being above the target rate of 2%. In October 2011, the Bank of England announced that it would undertake another round of QE, creating an additional £75 billion. In February 2012 it announced an additional £50 billion. In July 2012 it announced another £50 billion, bringing the total amount to £375 billion. The Bank has said that it will not buy more than 70% of any issue of government debt. This means that at least 30% of any issue of government debt will have to be purchased and held by institutions other than the Bank of England. In 2012 the Bank estimated that quantitative easing had benefited households differentially according to the assets they hold; richer households have more assets.

In August 2016, the Bank of England said it would buy an additional £60bn of UK government bonds and £10bn of corporate bonds, to address uncertainty over Brexit and worries about productivity and economic growth.

EUROPE

The European Central Bank said that it would focus on buying covered bonds, a form of corporate debt. It signalled that its initial purchases would be worth about €60 billion in May 2009.

At the beginning of 2013, the Swiss National Bank had the largest balance sheet relative to the size of the economy it was responsible for, at close to 100% of Switzerland's national output. A total of 12% of its reserves were in foreign equities. By contrast, the US Federal Reserve's holdings equalled about 20% of US GDP, while the European Central Bank's assets were worth 30% of GDP.

In a dramatic change of policy, on 22 January 2015 Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, announced an 'expanded asset purchase programme': where €60 billion per month of euro-area bonds from central governments, agencies and European institutions would be bought. Beginning in March 2015, the stimulus was planned to last until September 2016 at the earliest with a total QE of at least €1.1 trillion. Mario Draghi announced the programme would continue: 'until we see a continued adjustment in the path of inflation', referring to the ECB's need to combat the growing threat of deflation across the eurozone in early 2015.

On 10 March 2016, ECB increases its monthly bond purchases to €80 billion from €60 billion, started to include corporate bonds under the asset purchasing programme and announced new ultra-cheap four-year loans to banks.

SCANDINAVIA

Swedish National Bank launched quantitative easing in February 2015, announcing government bond purchases of nearly 1.2 billion USD. The annualised inflation rate in January 2015 was minus 0.3 percent, and the bank implied that Sweden's economy could slide into deflation.

JAPAN AFTER 2007 AND ABENOMICS

In early October 2010, the Bank of Japan announced that it would examine the purchase of ¥5 trillion (US$60 billion) in assets. This was an attempt to push down the value of the yen against the US dollar to stimulate the domestic economy by making Japanese exports cheaper; it did not work.

On 4 August 2011 the BOJ announced a unilateral move to increase the commercial bank current account balance from ¥40 trillion (US$504 billion) to a total of ¥50 trillion (US$630 billion).In October 2011, the Bank expanded its asset purchase program by ¥5 trillion ($66bn) to a total of ¥55 trillion.

On 4 April 2013, the Bank of Japan announced that it would expand its asset purchase program by 60 to 70 trillion Yen a year.

The Bank hoped to bring Japan from deflation to inflation, aiming for 2% inflation. The amount of purchases was so large that it was expected to double the money supply. This policy has been named Abenomics, as a portmanteau of economic policies and Shinzō Abe, the current Prime Minister of Japan.

On 31 October 2014, the BOJ announced the expansion of its bond buying program, to now buy 80 trillion Yen of bonds a year.

ECONOMIC IMPACT

Quantitative easing may cause higher inflation than desired if the amount of easing required is overestimated and too much money is created by the purchase of liquid assets.[18] On the other hand, QE can fail to spur demand if banks remain reluctant to lend money to businesses and households. Even then, QE can still ease the process of deleveraging as it lowers yields. However, there is a time lag between monetary growth and inflation; inflationary pressures associated with money growth from QE could build before the central bank acts to counter them.[88] Inflationary risks are mitigated if the system's economy outgrows the pace of the increase of the money supply from the easing. If production in an economy increases because of the increased money supply, the value of a unit of currency may also increase, even though there is more currency available. For example, if a nation's economy were to spur a significant increase in output at a rate at least as high as the amount of debt monetized, the inflationary pressures would be equalized. This can only happen if member banks actually lend the excess money out instead of hoarding the extra cash. During times of high economic output, the central bank always has the option of restoring reserves to higher levels through raising interest rates or other means, effectively reversing the easing steps taken.

Increasing the money supply tends to depreciate a country's exchange rates relative to other currencies, through the mechanism of the interest rate. Lower interest rates lead to a capital outflow from a country, thereby reducing foreign demand for a country's money, leading to a weaker currency. This feature of QE directly benefits exporters living in the country performing QE, as well as debtors, since the interest rate has fallen, meaning there is less money to be repaid. However, it directly harms creditors as they earn less money from lower interest rates. Devaluation of a currency also directly harms importers, as the cost of imported goods is inflated by the devaluation of the currency.

EFFECTIVENESS

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the quantitative easing policies undertaken by the central banks of the major developed countries since the beginning of the late-2000s financial crisis have contributed to the reduction in systemic risks following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The IMF states that the policies also contributed to the improvements in market confidence and the bottoming-out of the recession in the G7 economies in the second half of 2009.[20]

Economist Martin Feldstein argues that QE2 led to a rise in the stock market in the second half of 2010, which in turn contributed to increasing consumption and the strong performance of the US economy in late 2010. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan calculated that as of July 2012, there was "very little impact on the economy." Federal Reserve Governor Jeremy Stein has said that measures of quantitive easing such as large-scale asset purchases "have played a significant role in supporting economic activity".According to Neil Irwin, senior economic correspondent at The New York Times, quantitative easing by the US Federal Reserve likely contributed to: i) Lower interest rates for corporate bonds and mortgage rates, helping support housing prices; ii) Higher stock market valuation, in terms of a higher price-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 index; iii) Increased inflation rate and investor's expectations for future inflation; iv) Higher rate of job creation; and v) Higher rate of GDP growth.

RISKS

Economists such as John Taylor believe that quantitative easing creates unpredictability. Since the increase in bank reserves may not immediately increase the money supply if held as excess reserves, the increased reserves create the danger that inflation may eventually result when the reserves are loaned out.[93]

IMPACT ON SAVINGS AND PENSIONS

In the European Union, World Pensions Council (WPC) financial economists have also argued that artificially low government bond interest rates induced by QE will have an adverse impact on the underfunding condition of pension funds, since "without returns that outstrip inflation, pension investors face the real value of their savings declining rather than ratcheting up over the next few years".

HOUSING MARKET OVER-SUPPLY AND QE3

Richmond Federal Reserve Bank President Jeffrey M. Lacker, the only member of the Federal Open Market Committee to vote against QE3, stated: "The impetus ... is to aid the housing market. That's an area that's fallen short in this recovery. In most other U.S. postwar recoveries, we've seen a pretty sharp snap back in housing. Of course, the reason it hasn't come back in this recovery is that this recession was essentially caused by us building too many houses prior to the recession. We still have a huge overhang of houses that haven't been sold that are vacant.

CAPITAL FLIGHT

According to Bloomberg reporter David Lynch, the new money from quantitative easing could be used by the banks to invest in emerging markets, commodity-based economies, commodities themselves, and non-local opportunities rather than to lend to local businesses that are having difficulty getting loans.

INCREASED INCOME AND WEALTH INEQUALITY

The redistributive effects of QE policies is a frequent critic against quantitative easing. For instance, British Prime Minister Theresa May openly criticized QE in July 2016 for its regressive effects: “Monetary policy – in the form of super-low interest rates and quantitative easing – has helped those on the property ladder at the expense of those who can’t afford to own their own home.”[98] Dhaval Joshi of BCA Research wrote that "QE cash ends up overwhelmingly in profits, thereby exacerbating already extreme income inequality and the consequent social tensions that arise from it". Anthony Randazzo of the Reason Foundation wrote that QE "is fundamentally a regressive redistribution program that has been boosting wealth for those already engaged in the financial sector or those who already own homes, but passing little along to the rest of the economy. It is a primary driver of income inequality".

Those critics are partly based on some evidence provided by central banks themselves. In 2012, a Bank of England report showed that its quantitative easing policies had benefited mainly the wealthy, and that 40% of those gains went to the richest 5% of British households.

In May 2013, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Richard Fisher said that cheap money has made rich people richer, but has not done quite as much for working Americans.

Answering similar critics expressed by MEP Molly Scott Cato, the President of the ECB Mario Draghi once declared:

Some of these policies may, on the one hand, increase inequality but, on the other hand, if we ask ourselves what the major source of inequality is, the answer would be unemployment. So, to the extent that these policies help – and they are helping on that front – then certainly an accommodative monetary policy is better in the present situation than a restrictive monetary policy."

CRITICISM BY BRIC COUNTRIES

BRIC countries have criticized the QE carried out by the central banks of developed nations. They share the argument that such actions amount to protectionism and competitive devaluation. As net exporters whose currencies are partially pegged to the dollar, they protest that QE causes inflation to rise in their countries and penalizes their industries.

POLITICAL RISK

Richard W. Fisher, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, warned in 2010 that QE carries "the risk of being perceived as embarking on the slippery slope of debt monetization. We know that once a central bank is perceived as targeting government debt yields at a time of persistent budget deficits, concern about debt monetization quickly arises." Later in the same speech, he stated that the Fed is monetizing the government debt: "The math of this new exercise is readily transparent: The Federal Reserve will buy $110 billion a month in Treasuries, an amount that, annualized, represents the projected deficit of the federal government for next year. For the next eight months, the nation's central bank will be monetizing the federal debt."[109] Ben Bernanke remarked in 2002 that the US government had a technology called the printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent), so that if rates reached zero and deflation threatened, the government could always act to ensure deflation was prevented. He said, however, that the government would not print money and distribute it "willy nilly" but would rather focus its efforts in certain areas (e.g., buying federal agency debt securities and mortgage-backed securities).[110][111] According to economist Robert McTeer, former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, there is nothing wrong with printing money during a recession, and quantitative easing is different from traditional monetary policy "only in its magnitude and pre-announcement of amount and timing".

COMPARISON WITH OTHER INSTRUMENTS

Qualitative easing

Professor Willem Buiter of the London School of Economics has proposed a terminology to distinguish quantitative easing, or an expansion of a central bank's balance sheet, from what he terms qualitative easing, or the process of a central bank adding riskier assets to its balance sheet:

Quantitative easing is an increase in the size of the balance sheet of the central bank through an increase [in its] monetary liabilities (base money), holding constant the composition of its assets. Asset composition can be defined as the proportional shares of the different financial instruments held by the central bank in the total value of its assets. An almost equivalent definition would be that quantitative easing is an increase in the size of the balance sheet of the central bank through an increase in its monetary liabilities that holds constant the (average) liquidity and riskiness of its asset portfolio.

Qualitative easing is a shift in the composition of the assets of the central bank towards less liquid and riskier assets, holding constant the size of the balance sheet (and the official policy rate and the rest of the list of usual suspects). The less liquid and more risky assets can be private securities as well as sovereign or sovereign-guaranteed instruments. All forms of risk, including credit risk (default risk) are included.

CREDIT EASING

In introducing the Federal Reserve's response to the 2008–9 financial crisis, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke distinguished the new program, which he termed "credit easing", from Japanese-style quantitative easing. In his speech, he announced,

Our approach—which could be described as "credit easing"—resembles quantitative easing in one respect: It involves an expansion of the central bank's balance sheet. However, in a pure QE regime, the focus of policy is the quantity of bank reserves, which are liabilities of the central bank; the composition of loans and securities on the asset side of the central bank's balance sheet is incidental. Indeed, although the Bank of Japan's policy approach during the QE period was quite multifaceted, the overall stance of its policy was gauged primarily in terms of its target for bank reserves. In contrast, the Federal Reserve's credit easing approach focuses on the mix of loans and securities that it holds and on how this composition of assets affects credit conditions for households and businesses.

Credit easing involves increasing the money supply by the purchase not of government bonds but of private-sector assets, such as corporate bonds and residential mortgage–backed securities. In 2010, the Federal Reserve purchased $1.25 trillion of mortgage-backed securities to support the sagging mortgage market. These purchases increased the monetary base in a way similar to a purchase of government securities.

MONETARY FINANCING

Quantitative easing has been nicknamed "printing money" by some members of the media,central bankers, and financial analysts.Stephen Hester, chief executive officer of the RBS Group, said:

"What the Bank of England does in quantitative easing is it prints money to buy government debt, .... So the Quantitative Easing has enabled governments, this government, to run a big budget deficit without killing the economy because the Bank of England has financed it."

The Dutch Central Bank itself sees QE as being a money creation operation:

The Eurosystem directly injects money into the economy by purchasing the bonds with newly created electronic cash. This is called quantitative easing.

However, QE is a very different form of money creation than it is commonly understood when talking about "money printing". Indeed, the term printing money usually implies that newly created money is used to directly finance government deficits or pay off government debt (also known as monetizing the government debt). However, with QE, the newly created money is directly used to buy government bonds or other financial assets, Central banks in most developed nations (e.g., the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, and the EU) are prohibited from buying government debt directly from the government and must instead buy it from the secondary market.This two-step process, where the government sells bonds to private entities that in turn sell them to the central bank, has been called "monetizing the debt" by many analysts. Also, the Federal Reserve has mostly "sterilized" its bond purchases by paying interest to banks for reserve deposits. This removes money from circulation previously added by the Fed's bond purchases. The net effect is to raise bond prices, lowering borrowing rates for mortgages and other loans, without an inflationary increase in the money supply

The distinguishing characteristic between QE and monetizing debt is that with the former, the central bank creates money to stimulate the economy, not to finance government spending (although an indirect effect of QE is to lower rates on sovereign bonds). Also, the central bank has the stated intention of reversing the QE when the economy has recovered (by selling the government bonds and other financial assets back into the market). The only effective way to determine whether a central bank has monetized debt is to compare its performance relative to its stated objectives. Many central banks have adopted an inflation target. It is likely that a central bank is monetizing the debt if it continues to buy government debt when inflation is above target and if the government has problems with debt financing.

In fact, with the failure of quantitative easing programmes around the world, more and more people are precisely calling for a more overt and direct money printing process, including monetary financing of government budgets, Helicopter money or "QE for People" (see section below).

QE FOR THE PEOPLE

In response to concerns that QE is failing to create sufficient demand, particularly in the Eurozone, a number of economists have called for "QE for the people". Instead of buying government bonds or other securities by creating bank reserves, as the Federal Reserve and Bank of England have done, some suggest that central banks could make payments directly to households (in a similar fashion as Helicopter money). Economists Mark Blyth and Eric Lonergan argue in Foreign Affairs that this is the most effective solution for the Eurozone, particularly given the restrictions on fiscal policy. They argue that based on the evidence from tax rebates in the United States, less than 5% of GDP transferred by the ECB to the household sector in the Eurozone would suffice to generate a recovery, a fraction of what it intends to be done under standard QE. Oxford economist, John Muellbauer, has suggested that this could be legally implemented using the electoral register.

On 27 March 2015, 19 economists including Steve Keen, David Graeber, Ann Pettifor, Robert Skidelsky, and Guy Standing have signed a letter to the Financial Times calling on the European Central Bank to adopt a more direct approach to its quantitative easing plan announced earlier in February.

In November 2015, more than 65 economists supported the campaign 'Quantitative Easing for People', claiming that "Instead of flooding financial markets, money created through QE should be spent into the real economy, on essential public investment such as green infrastructure, affordable housing and/or distributed as a citizens’ dividend to all residents."

Those ideas were also discussed at the European Parliament on February 17, 2016.

ALTERING DEBT MATURITY STRUCTURE

Based on research by economist Eric Swanson reassessing the effectiveness of the US Federal Open Market Committee action in 1961 known as Operation Twist, The Economist has posted that a similar restructuring of the supply of different types of debt would have an effect equal to that of QE. Such action would allow finance ministries (e.g., the US Department of the Treasury) a role in the process now reserved for central banks.

FINALMENTE BLOG : AVARRALDE

Tiene 10 prguntas sobre la flexibilización a cargo de

Nouriel Roubini .

El autor alerta de que los importantes beneficios a corto plazo de las políticas monetarias no convencionales pueden tener efectos colaterales graves y costes a largo plazo altísimos si se mantienen en vigor durante demasiado tiempo, como sucede en Estados Unidos.

La mayoría de los observadores considera necesarias las políticas monetarias no convencionales, como la flexibilización cuantitativa (FC), para lograr que las anémicas economías actuales comiencen a crecer. Pero junto con esa percepción de necesidad, han comenzado a multiplicarse las preguntas sobre la eficacia y los riesgos de la FC. En especial, diez potenciales costes asociados con esas políticas merecen atención.

EN PRIMER LUGAR

Si bien una respuesta puramente “austríaca” (esto es, de austeridad) ante el estallido de las burbujas de activos y crédito puede conducir a una depresión, las políticas de FC que posponen excesivamente el necesario desapalancamiento en los sectores privado y público pueden crear un ejército de zombis: instituciones financieras zombis, hogares y empresas zombis y, finalmente, gobiernos zombis. Así que, en algún punto entre los extremos austríaco y keynesiano, es necesario eliminar paulatinamente la FC.

EN SEGUNDO LUGAR

La FC reiterada puede ir perdiendo eficacia a medida que los canales de transmisión hacia la actividad económica real se van obstruyendo. El canal de los bonos no funciona cuando sus rendimientos ya son bajos; y el del crédito no funciona cuando los bancos atesoran liquidez y colapsa la velocidad. De hecho, quienes pueden solicitar créditos (las empresas con elevadas calificaciones y los hogares en mejor posición) no desean hacerlo o no lo necesitan, mientras que quienes lo precisan -empresas muy apalancadas y hogares en peor situación- no pueden hacerlo por la restricción crediticia. El canal de la bolsa de valores que conduce a la reactivación económica después de la FC sólo funciona a corto plazo si no hay una recuperación del crecimiento. Y la reducción de las tasas de interés reales por un aumento de la inflación esperada cuando se implementa una FC abierta presenta el riesgo de agudizar eventualmente las expectativas inflacionarias.

EN TERCER LUGAR

El canal de transmisión de la FC a través del tipo de cambio -el debilitamiento de la moneda que implica una flexibilización monetaria- es ineficaz si varios bancos centrales importantes la implementan simultáneamente. Cuando eso sucede, la FC se convierte en un juego de suma cero, porque todas las monedas no pueden caer y todos los balances comerciales no pueden mejorar simultáneamente. El resultado, entonces, es el reemplazo de las “guerras cambiarias” por “guerras de FC”.

EN CUARTO LUGAR

La FC en economías avanzadas conduce a flujos de capital excesivos hacia los mercados emergentes, que enfrentan un difícil desafío para sus políticas. La intervención esterilizada sobre el mercado cambiario mantiene elevadas las tasas de interés locales y alimenta la entrada de divisas. Pero una intervención no esterilizada, o reducir las tasas de interés locales, genera un exceso de liquidez que puede alimentar la inflación local y burbujas de activos y crédito. Simultáneamente, renunciar a la intervención y permitir que se aprecie la moneda erosiona la competitividad externa, y eso conduce a peligrosos déficits en el comercio exterior. Sin embargo, es difícil implementar controles sobre los flujos de entrada de capitales y, a veces, esos controles son incompletos. Los controles macroprudenciales sobre el crecimiento del crédito son útiles, pero a veces ineficaces para detener las burbujas de activos cuando las tasas de interés bajas continúan sosteniendo condiciones de generosa liquidez.

EN QUINTO LUGAR

La FC reiterada puede conducir a burbujas de activos, tanto en su lugar de implementación como en aquellos países sobre los cuales se derrama. Esas burbujas pueden tener lugar en mercados de acciones, mercados de vivienda (Hong Kong y Singapur), mercados de productos básicos, mercados de bonos (hay quienes advierten sobre una burbuja que está creciendo en EEUU, Alemania, Reino Unido y Japón) y en mercados de crédito (donde los diferenciales en algunos mercados emergentes, y en la deuda corporativa de alto rendimiento y calidad se están reduciendo excesivamente). Si bien la FC puede estar justificada frente a débiles aspectos centrales económicos y de crecimiento, mantener las tasas demasiado bajas durante demasiado tiempo puede ocasionalmente alimentar esas burbujas. Es lo que sucedió entre 2000 y 2006, cuando la Reserva Federal estadounidense recortó agresivamente la tasa sobre los fondos federales al 1% durante la recesión de 2001 y la débil recuperación posterior, y luego las mantuvo bajas, alimentando las burbujas de crédito/vivienda/de alto riesgo.

EN SEXTO LUGAR

La FC puede crear problemas de riesgo moral al debilitar el incentivo de los gobiernos a implementar las reformas necesarias. También puede demorar una necesaria austeridad fiscal si se monetizan grandes déficits y, al mantener los tipos demasiado bajos, se impide que el mercado imponga disciplina.

EN SEPTIMO LUGAR

Abandonar la FC es difícil. Si la salida es demasiado lenta y tardía, puede generarse inflación y burbujas de activos/créditos. Además, si la salida se da mediante la venta de los activos a largo plazo adquiridos durante la FC, un brusco aumento en los tipos de interés puede asfixiar la recuperación y generar grandes pérdidas financieras para los tenedores de bonos a largo plazo. Y si la salida se ejecuta aumentando los tipos de interés sobre el exceso de reservas (para esterilizar el efecto de un excedente en la base monetaria sobre el crecimiento del crédito), las pérdidas en los balances de los bancos centrales podrían ser significativas.

EN OCTAVO LUGAR

Un período prolongado de tipos de interés reales negativos implica una redistribución del ingreso y de la riqueza de los acreedores y ahorradores a los deudores y prestamistas. De todas las formas de ajuste que pueden conducir al desapalancamiento (crecimiento, ahorro, reestructuración ordenada de la deuda o impuestos sobre la riqueza), la monetización de la deuda (y ocasionalmente una mayor inflación) es la menos democrática y golpea seriamente a los ahorradores y acreedores, incluidos los jubilados y los fondos de pensiones.

EN NOVENO LUGAR

La FC y otras políticas monetarias no convencionales pueden tener graves consecuencias no deliberadas. Eventualmente puede estallar una excesiva inflación, o el crecimiento del crédito puede desacelerarse en vez de aumentar, si los bancos -al enfrentar márgenes netos muy reducidos sobre las tasas de interés- deciden que la relación entre riesgo y recompensa es insuficiente.

FINALMENTE

Existe el riesgo de perder de vista los bloqueos a las políticas monetarias convencionales. Algunos países están dejando de lado sus políticas orientadas a controlar la inflación y entrando en territorios inexplorados, donde podrían no existir anclas para las expectativas de precios. EEUU ha pasado de la FC1 a la FC2 y, ahora, a la FC3, que es potencialmente ilimitada y está vinculada a una meta de desempleo. Las autoridades están discutiendo activamente las ventajas de las políticas de tipos negativos. Y los políticos han optado por una arriesgada estrategia de flexibilización del crédito en vista de la menor eficiencia de la FC.

EN RESUMEN

Las políticas están volviéndose menos convencionales, no más, y la claridad sobre los efectos a corto plazo, las consecuencias inesperadas y los impactos de largo plazo es escasa. Por cierto, la FC y otras políticas monetarias no convencionales tienen importantes beneficios a corto plazo. Pero si esas políticas se mantienen durante demasiado tiempo, sus efectos colaterales pueden ser graves y los costes a largo plazo altísimos.

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